Biosecurity Experts Tell Senate Pandemic Revealed Gaps in Preparedness
WASHINGTON — As COVID-19 deaths in the United States approach 1 million, maybe something worthwhile came out of the pandemic, biosecurity experts told a Senate panel Thursday.
At least now Americans and their lawmakers are willing to dedicate the resources needed to guard against the next biohazard, they said.
“Unfortunately, COVID-19 showed that these gaps were real,” said Christopher P. Currie, director of homeland security and justice at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. “The good news is that the pandemic put the spotlight on this.”
The GAO is preparing a report to Congress on how well the agencies assigned to detect and counter biohazards are preparing the nation for the next disease outbreak.
Much of the review focuses on BioWatch, a program to detect airborne pathogens potentially released by terrorists. Pathogens generally refer to viruses and toxic bacteria.
It was organized in 2001 under the administration of then-President George W. Bush after anthrax was mailed to members of Congress. The program describes itself as “the nation’s first early warning network of sensors to detect biological attack.”
BioWatch operates a system of detectors in 32 cities attached to Environmental Protection Agency air filters to monitor air quality, including for the presence of pathogens. The results are analyzed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Any tests revealing pathogens are passed on to the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, the latter of which operates its own program called the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office.
Preliminary findings from the GAO show a lack of coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies.
“We saw this to be the case in the COVID response, particularly as it relates to gaps in the supply chain,” Currie said.
In the early days of the pandemic, China, the United States and other countries instituted a lockdown to stop the spread of disease that interrupted the manufacturing and delivery of products worldwide. At the same time, truck drivers and longshoremen were either laid off or quit their jobs.
The result was a supply chain bottleneck that hurt the entire U.S. economy.
Currie said better preparedness could have avoided many of the supply chain problems.
“This simply can’t happen again,” he said.
He raised other alarms about the system for detecting pathogens. The air filters are blamed for either missing the presence of pathogens planted during tests or for false positives.
An audit of U.S. defenses against biological agents reported by the Associated Press on March 4, 2021, arrived at similar conclusions.
“There is no reason to keep this limping along the way it is,” said Asha M. George, director of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, a public policy foundation.
She recommended a comprehensive program that coordinates information from a variety of agencies, preferably using more effective technology. She also said the nation’s biodefense should be overseen by a deputy national security advisor who answers directly to the president.
Although COVID-19 appeared to be accidental, additional threats come from biological weapon programs operated by China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, she said.
“The biological threat continues to increase,” George said.
The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee called the hearing as Congress is scheduled to decide next year whether to continue funding for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office.
Comments from senators at the hearing indicated they were unlikely to authorize continued operation of the office without dramatic changes.
“The office is plagued with some challenges,” said Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio.
He and other senators said U.S. biodefense efforts were too fragmented and fraught with bad morale among employees.
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